

**PRESS RELEASE**

**Kachin Independence Army (KIA)**

*Translation from Burmese*

**20 June 2011**

**Laizar**

**To all Kachin nationals,**

1. Fighting has broken out between the Burmese Armed Forces and KIA forces commencing 9 June to date;
2. It is not the desire of the KIO to see the Kachin people face hardships due to the on-going fighting and it expresses its concern for their livelihood;
3. We wish to take this opportunity to state that the claims published in the state run Mirror news daily is totally false and, to that end, wish to provide an accurate and detailed account of the on-going crisis. And thus we are compelled to make this announcement;
4. On 8 June 2011, two members from Kamaya (437) of the Burmese Army strayed into the frontline area of No. 15 Regiment under KIA Battalion No. 3. Two intruders; one Sergeant and one soldier encountered KIA forces, with the sergeant absconding and Ye Naing (infantryman) of the Burmese Army being detained by our forces;
5. On the same day, at 1430 hours Captain Myat Ko Ko and Lt. Ko Ko Win, both from Kamaya (437) and fully armed, crossed into KIA territory and were subsequently detained;
6. Accordingly, a request was made by the Regional Commander of the Northern Command for the release of the members of the Burmese Army. At the same time, the Burmese Army took measures to reinforce its troops in KIA territory;
7. At 0300 hrs on 9 June 2011, troops from Kamaya (437) and Kamaya (348) arrived at Sangang village tract and began attacking the KIA frontline based there;
8. At 0500 hrs the KIO liaison office situated in Sangang village was surrounded and Lance Corporal Chang Yein arrested;
9. Later, KIA Regiment (15) instructed the frontline base to retreat to and regroup with KIA forces located in Bung-sin camp. While the incident had been taking place, at no time did the KIA forces return fire upon the Burmese Army;
10. On 9 June at 0700 hrs when the Burmese Army made the offensive to attack Bung-sin camp, the KIA forces were compelled to return fire in self-defense;
11. At 0800 hrs, the Northern Command contacted the KIO, and demanded the release of its members and proposed an exchange of detainees;
12. KIO Headquarters stated, on its part, for an official note be sent regarding the matter. The Burmese Army, however, failed to respond to our request and stated that there was no need for such communications;
13. Again at 1130 hrs, the Northern Command made contact;
14. After consultations with both sides, KIA forces commenced a cease-fire at 1145 hrs while the Burmese Army stopped its firing at 1230 hrs accordingly;
15. The Burmese Army later notified the KIA that Lance Corporal Chan Yein who had been detained succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced dead and his firearm later returned to the KIO forces at 1745 hrs;

16. The location where the Lance Corporal had been detained was not only within KIO territory but also situated in the KIO's liaison office. Thus it is evident that those responsible for the Burmese army in the frontline were making false fabrications in order to mislead their own authorities;
17. While the KIO, on its part, took the initiative and released Captain Myat Ko Ko and Captain Ko Ko Win and infantry-manYe Naing together with their weapons at 1834 hrs, to date the Northern Command has failed to release KIO members who have been detained since the fighting began;
18. On the same day at 1600 hrs, a request by the Colonel Aung Toe, Tactical Commander based in Moemeit to enter KIA frontline territory to inspect Tarpein Electrical Power Plant and an overnight stop-over was approved by the KIO;
19. Numerous requests regarding the return of Lance Corporal Chan Yein's body were made by the KIO to the Northern Command and it finally returned on 10 June at 1455 hrs;
20. Inspection of Lance Corporal Chan Yein's body showed injuries indicating that he may have been tortured;
21. It became evident that the trip by Tactical Commander Colonel Aung Toe of the Northern Command was in fact a ploy used to intrude into KIO territory and they later insisted that they (Burmese troops) would not retreat from Bung-sing camp and that the KIA forces would have to do so;
22. While the Tactical Commander and his troops remained, reinforcements from Khalaya (237), Khamaya (320), Khamaya (348), Khalaya (236), Khalaya (74), Khalaya (21), Khalaya (105), Khamaya (321), Khalaya (141), Khalaya (37) were subsequently sent;
23. Accordingly, a strong ultimatum was made on 11 June at 1200 hrs for the withdrawal of KIA forces from Bung-sing camp;
24. Due to the unavoidable circumstances stated above, the KIA forces have been compelled to engage in fighting and wish to inform the Kachin people of the true situation.

**Public Information Department**

**LAIZAR**